Introduction
The principal form of agricultural organization throughout much of the world is, and historically has been, the traditional owner-operated family farm, or perhaps an equivalent share-cropping arrangement, with occasional use of minimal hired labor or off-farm employment of family members. The chief exceptions to this rule, since the decline of the large feudal estates and the ending of slaveplantation agriculture, were the collectivized and state farms, now being privatized, in the former Soviet Union, eastern Europe, and other Marxist regimes, but these have been politically rather than economically motivated. In the last 20 years or so, this pattern has increasing been broken in the U. S., where, in 1988, 45 percent of all agricultural land was leased and where 41 percent of all farmers operated at least some leased land. I argue that the traditional pattern of owneroperated family farming is the prevailing pattern in transitional and modernizing agriculture for reasons similar to those advanced by Coase (1937) in his general discussion of the nature of the firm, given the highly location-specific nature of land and managerial human capital in agriculture. This hypothesis also accounts for inheritance patterns and the thinness of agricultural land markets in the developing world. Agricultural modernization, however, breaks down the dependence of agricultural production on location-specific factors and leads to increased corporatization of agriculture and to a considerable diversity of organizational structures. Regional and commodity differences in the U.S., as revealed in the
Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Surveys and the Farm Costs and Returns
Surveys, support the theory that modernization of agriculture is responsible for the decline of the traditional form of organization as an economic institution. Even large-scale farming, employing substantial amounts of leased land and machinery and, often, hired labor, remains a basically family-controlled operation even in the U.S.
in the nineties.
be good reasons for the exceptions to the general rule. Tropical plantation agriculture is one. But the specific crops and localities for which and where it is practiced today suggest that the nature of technology or of resources is different from that posited. (See Pryor, 1982 . Pryor, 1980a and 1980b , also contain usful discussions of alternative forms of agricultural organization.) Corporatized or collectivized agriculture has been practiced from time to time and place to place.
It has often failed, perhaps only after some time. When it lasts, it may be for ideological or political reasons as in the Israeli kibbutzim, or the Soviet Union,
• is uncertainty. But as we now know from Arrow and Debreu's analysis of risk and equilibrium (1954) , uncertainty is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of entrepreneurs of the sort Knight is talking about, and thus of the existence of firms in Coase's sense. This is because in the absence of transactions costs, which may preclude a full set of contingent contracts and the existence of certain markets, contractual arrangements would exist which would enable individuals to reach Knightian equilibrium on their own, thus obviating the need for firms to organize economic life, as Coase himself was quick to see. But Coase puts the matter in another way. He considers rather what determines the size of the firm, zero being one limit and the whole of the economy being the other: "Why, if by organizing one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions at all?" Coase (1988, pp. 42-43) . "... a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing another firm." (p. 44) Thus the same factors which lead to the existence of firms also limit their size, and moreover can explain why firms typically produce more than one product.
Transactions costs vary a great deal and are sometimes so large as to preclude any transactions of a particular type and therefore associated markets. The chief reasons for such variation appear to be heterogeneity of the characteristics of the commodity exchanged and the lack of information or uncertainty about those characteristics on the part of one or both parties to the exchange.
"Small" is defined in the context of the organization of agricultural production in terms of the size of the decision-making and ownership unit. The prevalent form of the organization of agricultural production in traditional and transitional agriculture is the owner-operated family farm in which a single extended or nuclear family both owns the principal factors of production, land and labor, and supplies the organizational and managerial function. Although there are many variations on this pattern, it is in sharp contrast to the "corporate" form of organization in which the management function is largely separated from the ownership of factors of production or intermediate inputs. In a "corporate" form of organization, the decision-maker or manager or entrepreneur is a residual claimant and virtually frequently the sole residual claimant. That is, in corporate production almost all factors of production are purchased, rented or contracted for, and almost all products are disposed of on the market. What is it about agricultural production and the nature of agricultural factors and management in a traditional and in a transitional context which leads to a form of organization which combines ownership and management and expands residual as opposed to contractual claims, often in farms which are passed down through several generations of the same family?
In his discussion of share tenancy and other forms of contractual arrangements in agriculture, Barzel (1989) argues that, " In agriculture, weather, pests, and other forces affect output differently in different periods and in different locations. In addition, no two pieces of land or two workers are identical to each other. Determining the properties of each unit of input requires extensive and costly measurement. Owing to diversity in the forces that affect output, the specific contributions of individuals are extremely difficult to determine." Such heterogeneity leads to inefficiency when production is organized along textbook lines by firms which purchase, rent or contract for every input or intermediate output and dispose of all final products on the market: "Each acre of land differs from all others, even from the ones adjacent to it, in a variety of ways: in the incidence of rocks, in steepness, in the degree of soil erosion, in the amounts of various nutrients, in exposure to wind and sun. Land parcels also differ from one another in such features as access to ground water, quality and quantity of irrigation canals, availability of plumbing equipment, types of roads serving them, and distance to markets. Moreover, the ease of exploiting such features also varies.
Land use would be efficient if landlords were compensated by the users of land for the exact reduction in land value. Because land is not uniform, however, the exact evaluation of these effects requires measurement at every spot. Nerlove, Vbsti and Basel (1994) have found that, on a significant number of farms, some family members work at least part-time off farm and some hired labor is used at the same time. Similar results are reported by Rosenzweig (1978) . This fact is clearly a result of labor heterogeneity and probably of seasonality in the type of labor required as well.
In agriculture the most heterogeneous factor of all is management because of the location-specific human capital embodied in human agents engaged in production.
Intimate knowledge of soil types and typographies of a particular farm in relation to the vagaries of weather, temperature, sunlight, water, and of pests, and of different plants' and animals' responses is required for successful farming and is not easily or instantly acquired. While this is particularly true in traditional agriculture, it remains true to some extent in modern agriculture, since modern inputs and techniques free one somewhat from location-specific responses and the vagaries of weather and of pests and knowledge of them can more readily be acquired 2 Share leasing includes sharecropping, which involves direct transfer of a portion of the crop from tenant to landlord, and transfer of a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the entire crop. The latter is common in modern agricultural settings in which little or no farm output is consumed directly. The kind of location-specific human capital required for successful and efficient farm management is acquired only in a time-consuming process and is not easily transferable to distant locations and/or different types of agriculture. It is doubtful that an agent would be willing to make the investment required were he or she not a long-term residual claimant. It would be virtually impossible for an outside owner of one of the principal factors of production to know the specifics of the human capital embodied in a hired manager or to monitor the management function except at great cost. The problem is exacerbated by the considerable production uncertainty in agriculture. Again there appear to be strong reasons for making management a residual claimant. But agricultural modernization may result in management being the only residual claimant, as is prevalent in the corporate industrial sector. The same reasoning may be used to account for the prevalence of family farming in which some family members in subsequent generations inherit the farm. And like language, location-specific agricultural human capital is most easily acquired by growing up with one's teacher. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) advance essentially the same rationale for the thinness of land markets and farm inheritance patterns in LDC's.
Because agricultural production is subject to great uncertainty and requires an abundance of location-specific knowledge, there is a need for timely decisions made on the spot. Thus labor and management functions are frequently combined in one or more individuals living on the farm. In Nerlove (1974) I have already alluded to one source of "scale economies" in my discussion of how relevant human capital is acquired in agriculture and the importance and prevalence of family farming. But there are other sources, some of which may be achieved by cooperative or other institutional arrangements while still leaving production in the hands of small units, and some of which positively constrain the lower limit of the optimal size of the production unit in agriculture. I deal with some of these in the next section of this paper in which I discuss alternative, viable organizational forms. Many problems associated with lumpy capital inputs can be resolved by rental arrangements but some cannot. For example, farm structures such as barns and silos cannot easily be rented in part because they have to be of a certain size and to be located near the locus of production. Certain types of farm machinery have to be under the sole control of a decision-maker and located where they are used in order to be utilized in a timely fashion due to the common vagaries of weather and of the seasons across many farms in a given region. But the prime indivisibility in agriculture is associated with the managerial function. One farmer and his family can certainly manage efficiently more than a tiny enterprise and better managers can manage more than poorer ones. Moreover, larger units may have readier access to credit, particularly if they are larger in terms of some easily collateralizable asset such as land. There are thus lower limits to the optimal size of farms as well as upper limits and these scale economies will tend to be even more location specific than the diseconomies which are the principal reason for the prevalence of owner-operated family farms.
Those characteristics of agriculture which make relatively small scale production by factors which are largely residual claimants optimal are: (1)The uncertain, varied and location-specific nature of agricultural technology. (2)Great heterogeneity of the principal factors of production, land, labor and management.
(3)The considerable investment in location-specific human capital required to achieve efficient agricultural production under conditions of climatic variability and the prevalence of pests. Moreover, the efficient mode of accumulation of the required human capital and the complimentarity of different family members in the productive and seasonal processes which characterize agriculture lead to a pattern of family farming and inheritance.
The Evidence for Pre-Modern Agriculture
In their comprehensive survey of agricultural land relations and policy, H.P.
Binswanger, K. Deininger, and G. Feder (forthcoming) list four main types of agricultural organization currently prevalent in both pre-modern and modern agriculture.
Family Farms. Such farms have already been described in detail above in conjunction with the hypothesis that they are by and large the most efficient form of productive organization in traditional and transitional agriculture. Nonetheless, family farming is characterized by great diversity and many second-best solutions which may involve land rental, both in and out, and hiring of labor and/or full-or part-time employment of family members off farm. In some cases, input purchases or rentals or marketing of final products may be performed cooperatively in order to achieve economies of scale not otherwise available. and/or distributor in advance of the growing season, which may in some cases be continuous, to supply specific quantities and qualities of product on certain dates and at prices fixed in advance. The contract provides the farmer assured sale at an assured price and sometimes also for technical assistance, credit, services or other inputs from the purchaser. Plantations remain in existence largely for a number of highly specialized tropical crops such as rubber and tea in Sri Lanka and rubber and palm oil in Malaysia. Historically, they have been important in sugar production (Brazil and Cuba), coffee (Java), bananas (Central America and Equador), and cotton and tobacco (ante-bellum U.S.), as well as rubber, tea, and palm oil. Attempts establish cocoa and peanuts as plantation crops in Africa have failed.
In his definitive study of Plantation Agriculture, P.P. Courtenay (1965 Courtenay ( , 1980 Timely processing requiring a large capital investment (sugar, rubber, palm oil, tea) originally required a continuous flow of the raw material to ensure full utilization of expensive equipment. Contract farming for many such crops now resolves this problem, however, without the necessity of a plantation organization.
Large poultry enterprises in the U.S. (Perdue, 1989 ) operate on a similar principle.
Plantation production of bananas originated in the development of refrigerated steam ships in the 1880's. United Fruit Co. had a monopoly of the transportation and marketing infrastructure; integration of the actual production of bananas served to ensure timely arrival after harvest at the point of refrigeration. Such coordination is now largely accomplished by producer cooperatives. Thus plantation and estate agriculture not only occur under rather special circumstances which do not characterize agriculture generally, but seem to be giving way to other institutions which resolve some of the problems such organizations were designed to cope with and at the same time permit production to be organized more efficiently. Cash Grain. The nearly half million farms in 1987 that fit this classification look more, in some ways, like the farms I described above in traditional and transitional agriculture. They are operated by individuals and families who own a significant part of the land they farm. On the other hand, these operators also tend to lease a good deal of land (54%) which they farm as well. Both the ownership holdings and area farmed tend to be rather large and are increasing over time while the number of farms in this category is falling over time. The major source of these changes has been technical innovation in machinery and in cultural practices, which has reduced labor requirements, increased capital requirements and has facilitated increased specialization. According to Reimund and Gale (1991, p. 43 ) these farmers tend to lease rather than purchase land "...as a strategy to conserve capital resources and limit their debt exposure while allowing them to enlarge their farming operations." While these operators are almost always full-time farmers, limiting their income from off-farm employment, they are heavily dependent of government programs (in 1987, 59% of all direct payments to all farmers went to cash grain farms and 23% of this sector's receipts from commodity sales was accounted for by such payments; Reimund and Gale, 1991, p. 42) . They are heavily dependent on the nonfarm sector of the economy for the inputs other than land which they use in production.
Organization of Modern
Beef Cattle. The picture that many of us have from Western movies of a large cattle ranch consisting of several thousand acres of rangeland, hundreds of freely roaming longhorns, worked by a dozen cowboys on horses, simply does not correspond to reality. Although such large-scale cattle ranches exist (cluster 12, Appendix), they are the exception rather than the rule. Cattle raising (clusters 4 and 6, Appendix) is carried out on more than half a million very small farms by mostly part-time farmers or in combination with the growing of wheat and sorghum on larger spreads in the Great Plains and Mountain states, in which the land is primarily devoted to crop production. Small operations (85% had less than $25,000 in annual sales in 1987) specializing in cow-calf and feeder cattle production sold to cattle feedlots for finishing supply the bulk of U.S. beef today (Reimund and Gale, 1991, p. 43) . These farms are concentrated in the eastern parts of Texas and Oklahoma, along the Gulf Coast, and in Appalachia. Nearly 60% of the operators of such farms reported in 1987 that farming was not their principal occupation and 60% reported that they worked 200 days or more off-farm (Reimund and Gale, 1991, p.44 ). Cattle raising lends itself very well to small-scale production; land labor and capital requirements are low per head; and operations can be carried out on marginal land.
In contrast to cash grain farming, most of the land used to raise cattle is owned by the farm opeiator (38% overall was leased in 1987, much of this Federally owned grazing land); 70% of beef cattle producers reported in 1987 that they owned all of the land they used (Reimund and Gale, 1991, p. 44) . Off-farm income provides a considerable part of the cash flow necessary to finance cattle raising operations and reduces the operator's exposure to the income uncertainty inherent in the high variance of slaughter and feeder calf prices.
Poultry. Poultry production is carried out almost exclusively in a large scale vertically integrated industry. The operation of one large poultry operation on the Eastern Shore of Maryland is well-described in Perdue (1989) . Before 1950, poultry production was organized by small, geographically dispersed farmers usually located near large urban areas, selling poultry and eggs on the open market and purchasing a large part of the feed they used. Today's large scale poultry operations grew from the feed suppliers who ultimately integrated their business with the production and marketing of the final product to take advantage of new technology in marketing, genetics and poultry nutrition. A typical company on the Eastern Shore contracts with a large number of independent farmers per pound of live weight less the costs of feed, which the company supplies. The company owns title to the baby chicks throughout the process and supplies these to the farmer from a tightly controlled hatching operation, which is also contracted out to a much smaller number of farmers, in order to limit the loss of important proprietary genetic information.
The farmer owns outright one or more chicken houses, each of which cost about $100,000 on average in 1993, and is typically up to his eyeballs in debt for this reason. Each chicken house holds about 25,000 birds; a flock matures in about 7
weeks and losses from deaths run about 6%. Chicks are replaced after a brief hiatus of a week or 10 days. Thus, total output of a chicken house runs about 150,000 birds per year. The manure is the farmer's to keep and he usually uses this on his fields, on which he grows corn and soybeans which are in turn sold on the open market.
Overall, local farmers supply about 60% of the needs of the poultry companies' feed operations on the Eastern Shore. (The use of the manure is alleged to be the cause of the severe environmental degradation of the Chesapeake Bay in recent years; a growing aquaculture industry on the Eastern Shore may alleviate some of these problems.) After the chickens are harvested, the company slaughters, disassembles and markets the birds. The residual--heads, feet, feathers, offal--is cooked, ground up and used to formulate the feed mixture which the company supplies to the farmers with whom it has contracted. The farmer's contribution to this process seems to be limited to controlling the ventilation and temperature of the chicken house, keeping the birds comfortable, and assiduously clearing out dead birds to control the spread of disease. Feed and water supply is highly automated. While the farmer spends only a small fraction of his time in these activities they are extremely important in determining the efficiency of the process by which feed is converted into chicken meat. On the spot decisions and a constant presence near by are required for success. Thus these farmers generally do not work off farm but do combine chicken raising with other farming activities. Their heavy debt load is said to sharpen their incentives to perform well. (Given a contract the farmer generally has little trouble in raising capital at favorable rates.) It seems to me that the structure of this industry makes perfectly good sense in the light of the theory proposed above stressing the importance of location-specific human capital and sequential decisions in agriculture. Only that part of the operation which involves on the spot decisions is actually contracted out, and that with a highly refined regard to incentives.
This industry is concentrated in the Atlantic Coast states from Delaware to Georgia and in Arkansas. These areas would otherwise be areas which would lose substantial agricultural population to nonagricultural activities, although the number of farmers involved is small, about 38,000 in 1987.
Leasing in U. S. Agriculture
Three recent publications of the USDA/ERS (Reining, 1990; Rogers, 1991; and Wunderlich, 1991) describe the structure of land ownership and tenure in U.S.
agriculture in detail based on the 1987 Census of Agriculture, earlier censuses, and on the 1988 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS). These publications and the data on which they are based give a dramatic picture of widespread leasing of land in the U.S., the type of leases found, and who leases to whom, which, at first glance, seems much at variance with the story emphasizing the importance of location-specific human capital in traditional and transitional agriculture.
Leasing of land in U.S. agriculture is highly significant, but its prevalence varies from commodity to commodity and from region to region. Overall in 1988, 45%
of all land used in agriculture was leased and 41% of all farmers operated at least some leased land. Full owners, who operate only the land they themselves own, constitute the dominant tenure class, 59%; part owners, who operate some land that they themselves own and additional leased land, make up 29% of all operators and farmed 56% of all land in farms and leased more than 65% of the rented land; pure tenants, who own no land themselves, constitute 12% of all farmer operators and operated 15% of all land in farms. It is interesting to note that, while the percentage of land leased has remained roughly constant over the last century, the number of pure tenants has declined dramatically. Most of the owners who lease land to others are individuals or families, 84%, the remainder being partnerships or corporations, many of which are family held.
Most landlords lease land only to one tenant and their leases are small, averaging only 180 acres for those who do no farming themselves and 142 acres for operating owners. Although small farms ($2,500-19,999 1969 $'s) both rented in and rented out most of the land rented, the importance of land rented in by large farms ($100,000
and over 1969 $'s) has been growing dramatically. Reining (1991) describes the concentration of sales of agricultural products from farms in the largest size class and attributes much of this concentration to increase control over land resources, much of which is by lease rather than acquisition. "Rental contracts for land are generally easier and faster than land purchases. Renting, therefore, allows [large,
price responsive] farmers to respond to commodity price increases more readily than if they purchased the land." (p.2) Leasing land also permits such farmers to contract rapidly and at minimal cost when market conditions are not favorable.
Owners who lease land to others are older than owners on the average, disproportionately 60 and older. More than half are retired, many from farming, and many are women, and these landlords tend to live on or near the land they rent to others, although nonoperating owners participate very little in farming decisions.
Pure cash and pure share leases make up 94% of all leases and cover 95% of all acres leased. Share leases typically allow more participation by the landlord in the management of the farm operation and for sharing some of the expenses, but clsh leases predominate overall, 64% of all leases. The prevalence of cash leases among nonoperating owners, 65%, is somewhat greater than among owners who also farm, 57%, which presumably reflects a more active participation by the latter in the actual decisions. The percentage of farmland rented under cash leases has increased and under share leases declined in the last 20 years. These fractions also vary considerably from one region to another in the U.S. Cash leases predominate in the so lease their assets in order to realize a return from them, which presumably exceeds that which could be achieved by selling the land and investing the proceeds.
Renters, on the other hand, are primarily active farmers who own land of their own and rent in order to augment their access to land resources without risking scarce capital assets through purchase. The lack of participation by most landlords in decision-making in the production process and greater involvement in marketing decisions under share-leasing agreements suggests that incentives for cooperation in the face of sequentially resolvable uncertainty is not an important factor in determining the form of lease.
Conclusions
Agricultural organization, historically and in developing countries, can be 
